New Horizons in Islamic Studies (Second Series)
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This second series of 'New Horizons in Islamic Studies' presents the abundant results of the National Institutes for the Humanities (NIHU) program for Islamic Area Studies (IAS) carried out in Japan from 2006 to date. This program emphasizes multidisciplinary research on the dynamism of Muslim societies, in both Islamic and non-Islamic areas around the world. By taking a historical approach and adopting regional comparison methods in the study of current issues, the program seeks to build a framework of empirical data on Islam and Islamic Civilization.

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Money, power and Muslim communities in late imperial Russia

James H. Meyer

The movement for Muslim cultural reform, or “Jadidism,” has long been a popular subject of investigation in the historiography relating to Muslim communities in late imperial Russia. While scholars have examined Jadidism in different ways over the years, in most cases the movement for Muslim cultural reform has been discussed primarily in terms of the “ideas” of a rather small number of well-known activist-intellectuals. Muslim opposition to Jadidism, meanwhile, has likewise been discussed primarily in terms of the “arguments” and “debates” taking place in the Muslim periodical press between Jadids and their conservative rivals, often referred to as “Qadims.” Although idea-based approaches to Jadidism have at times provided valuable insights into subjects like the nature of elite rivalries in Muslim communities, at the same time such approaches can also leave the impression that the issue of Muslim cultural reform was something that concerned only a relatively small number of people.

This chapter examines the movement for Muslim cultural reform beyond the margins of the periodical press. Rather than discuss “Jadidism” as an abstract concept, I focus upon individual Jadids, their projects, and the responses of other Muslims to these projects. By using state archival sources and other materials that have traditionally not been employed in studies of Jadidism, I look at the ways in which the movement for Muslim cultural reform played out in the mud-splattered villages and obscure schools which constituted, in many ways, the front lines in the culture wars taking place within Muslim communities in the late imperial era. While intellectual debates and “cultural capital” no doubt constituted important components in these battles, divisions within Muslim communities over the post-1905 expansion of Jadidist education also stemmed from much more tangible concerns, including those related to money and power. Focusing comparatively upon three distinct geographical areas of the empire, I argue that the activities of the Jadids—while often rejected by non-elites—nevertheless mattered to a community of Muslims far larger than the narrow circle of activists with whom these projects are normally associated. The activities of the Jadids mattered to many non-elites because reform projects, in addition to reflecting “ideas” over which elite Muslims debated, also impinged directly upon a variety of issues related to more tangible concerns, including those related to money and political power, that were of interest to a much broader cross-section of Muslims.

Muslim education and the expansion of Jadidism

In a number of ways, the movement for Muslim cultural reform resembled cultural and intellectual movements taking place in Muslim communities throughout the Middle East and beyond. While Muslim cultural reformers in Russia and elsewhere embraced a variety of reform positions, the Jadid movement was associated mainly with the issue of educational reform. Jadids advocated the teaching of literacy, usually in the form of local vernaculars or in “Turkic,” and were critical of traditional Muslim educational approaches which emphasized the acquisition of skills such as the memorization and recitation of sacred texts written in Arabic. Jadids also favored the introduction of what they considered to be more “orderly” approaches to Muslim education, advocating the stricter regulation of both space and time by seating students in rows and dividing the day into separate periods devoted to the study of different subjects. Notably, the teaching of Russian was also supported by most Jadids, as well as the study of secular subjects alongside religious ones. Schools and teachers which subscribed to such approaches were known in Russia as adhering to the “new method,” or wasi-i cedit.

The best-known Muslim cultural reform figure in Russia was Ismail Gaspirskii. Gaspirskii not only wanted to change the manner of Muslim education through the teaching of literacy, but also hoped to overhaul the entire culture of Muslim education in Russia. In the 1880s and 1890s, Gaspirskii traveled frequently across the Crimea, the Volga-Ural region, and Central Asia in his efforts to popularize new method education. Elsewhere, other Jadids, such as Rizaeddin Fahreddin, Galimkan Barudi and Musa Bigi, opened schools in the Volga-Ural region, mostly in urban areas, such as Kazan, Chistopol, and Orenburg. In the southern Caucasus, meanwhile, a small number of new method schools were opened in the largest of cities, such as Tbilisi, Baku, and Yerevan. By 1895, Gaspirskii surmised that there existed a little over one hundred new method schools in all of Russia.

Estimates relating to the number of new method schools in Russia vary, particularly with regard to the growth in number of new method schools taking place after 1905. Indeed, in this respect—as is the case regarding many other aspects of Muslim life in imperial Russia—exact state estimates were often wildly off the mark and frequently contradicted one another. In 1909, for example, officials in Orenburg indicated that there were no new method schools operating in their province, whereas sources written in the languages of Muslim communities themselves indicate that the province of Orenburg was actually one of the major centers of new method activity in Russia. In another government report from 1900, it was stated that in the province of Kazan there were only 191 new method schools out of a total of 913 Muslim schools in the province. This finding contradicted the opinion of a separate report, written in the same year, which stated that in the province of Kazan “up to 90 percent of all Muslim confessional schools are currently run according to the new method.”
The economics of Muslim cultural reform

Although conditions at new method schools could vary substantially with respect to resources, teachers working at the more prestigious new method schools in cities like Kazan, Ufa, and Simferopol often received salaries that traditional medrese teachers could only dream of. The contrast could be stark. Most traditional medrese teachers were lower-level personnel in the Muslim spiritual assemblies who received no fixed salary, and teaching the village's children often represented one of their few opportunities to earn cash. Otherwise, compensation to spiritual personnel consisted mainly of in-kind payments such as an allotment of the village's harvest or else a small plot of land upon which they could grow their own food, arrangements which could be quickly overturned during periods of famine. And famine would indeed strike during the years following the 1905 Revolution. Beginning no later than 1909, Mifti Soltanov of the Orenburg Assembly appealed on numerous occasions to government authorities in an effort to receive funding to help Muslim spiritual personnel buy food. These requests were only met in 1912, when the government agreed to provide the Orenburg Assembly with a loan of 50,000 rubles to feed spiritual personnel considered to be in danger of starvation.

Even as spiritual personnel were going hungry, the merchants who established some of the most prestigious new method schools during these years were offering salaries that sometimes seemed exorbitant by comparison. Salaries among teachers at the Hüsîneyiye Medrese in Kargalı (Qarghali), established by Ahmet Bey Hüseyinov in 1903, averaged 336 rubles per year in 1903–05, and almost 400 rubles per year in 1913–14. A 1908 job advertisement for teachers at the new method Medrese-yi Usmanîye in Ufa offered monthly salaries ranging from 10 to 25 rubles, depending on the applicant's qualifications. In 1910, an official in the Department of Spiritual Affairs observed that "unlike teachers in traditional schools," or stanîmetodî [school] teachers, all of the teachers in new method schools receive a predetermined salary, ranging from 100 to 700 rubles per year, or more, depending on the specific qualifications and experience of the teacher, while other reports estimated these salaries at between 200 and 600 rubles per year. Meanwhile, other remunerative opportunities for new method teachers came in the form of stipends and grants (sometimes as much as 500 rubles) provided for projects such as the production of new textbooks, with money provided by philanthropists such as the Hüseyinov brothers. Faced with the arrival of new method teachers in their villages, traditional teachers fought back, appealing to the Orenburg Assembly and civil officials in efforts to have recently opened new method schools closed down. In 1906, for example, an imam named Mehmed Zakir Abdürrahimoglu from the village of Bük Şikte in the province of Simbirsk wrote to the Orenburg Assembly to complain that his students had been stolen from him. While Abdürrahimoglu had been in Ufa on business pertaining to the Orenburg Assembly, the village müezzin, Mehmed Arif Alimoğlu, had set up a new method school in his absence, and Abdürrahimoglu now turned to the Orenburg Assembly in his effort to get the school closed down.

In a similar case in 1912, the Orenburg Assembly ruled on two complaints that had been made in 1909 regarding the teaching of an Imam Beyazitov at a medrese in the village of Sair-Novski. The school in the village, it was explained in the ruling, had been constructed on the specific condition that new method education would not take place there. Habibullah Hüseyinov, an imam in the village, had already driven away two teachers for teaching in the new method in 1907 and 1908, and
then attempted to drive away Beyazitov as well. In 1909, both Huseyinov and his co-plaintiff, “the wife of Imankulov” (the widow of an earlier teacher), appealed to the Orenburg Assembly to remove Beyazitov from the school. In his defense, Beyazitov acknowledged that he had indeed originally taught according to the new method. However, he said, he had switched to traditional methods of teaching in the face of opposition from the community. The assembly concluded that, while “it is not the place for the Orenburg Assembly to determine the correct style of education for children, the complaints of Huseyinov and the wife of Imankulov do not appear to be well founded,” and ruled that Beyazitov should be allowed to stay at the school.45

On some occasions, tensions were created within a community when Jadids attempted to open a new method school in a community where a school already existed. In the Crimean city of Karasubazar, an organization calling itself the “Muslim charitable organization of Karasubazar” requested permission from the Simferopol inspector for non-Russian education to open a new method mekteb with the goal of teaching Russian language. The school, they wrote, would be located in the building where a government operated Russian-Tatar school currently existed.46 Students attending the existing school, it was envisioned, would become students at the new Jadid school.

In response to this plan, a group of twenty-three “Tatar residents of the city of Karasubazar” petitioned the inspector in opposition to these plans, arguing that they could not afford to pay money for their children’s education, something which was required at the new method school. The fees demanded by the school, they argued, were too expensive and would “serve only a small portion (menznachitel’naiia chast) of the population.”47 In October, supporters of the new method school wrote again to the inspector. As was the case with the new method school’s opponents, the school’s supporters invoked the community in advocating their position by writing “the community is very pleased by the opening of the new method schools by the Muslim Charitable Society.”48

Sometimes, opponents of new method teachers would take matters into their own hands, running a new method teacher out of town or threatening him with violence. In March 1909, Fatih Kerimi49 received a letter from an imam in Tiumen named Selim Ginyi bin Khayir al-din Gabidov. Gabidov was a new method teacher who had spent nearly two years on the educational front. After studying in Kazan, Gabidov had taken a teaching job outside Penza at a school sponsored by the Akkun family of Simbirsk.50 Before long, however, a coalition of “old rightists” who were tied to the “school” (kuri baysal) and “old radicals” who controlled the “school” managed to convince enough people to withdraw their children, forcing the school to shut down. From Penza, Gabidov traveled to Tiumen, where he again taught according to the new method, this time thanks to the sponsorship of a local merchant. In his letter to Kerimi, Gabidov described once being descended upon by a mob of “forty to fifty” people demanding he leave town. Nevertheless, he wrote that he had met with some success in Tiumen, developing seven groups of students and earning between 5 and 10 rubles per month cash, while his wife brought in still more money by teaching three classes of girls. However, wrote Gabidov, he and his wife were forced to end their teaching activities due to the meddling of “the enemies of the community” (milletke dashnamar).51

The relationship between Muslim communities and new method education was a complicated one. On the one hand, the number of new method schools increased exponentially after 1905, particularly in the Volga-Ural region and the Crimea. While many of these schools closed soon after they were opened, many others stayed open for years. Jadids working in the hinterlands often complained against the machinations of tyrannical mullahs who set the community against them, but in at least some cases it seems clear that new method schools failed either because of a lack of local interest in new method education more generally, or because of the shortcomings or lack of experience of the teachers employed at the school.52 On some occasions entire villages, or at least significant portions of them, were actively involved in repelling new method teachers from a school or village, but in most cases the individuals who appear to have been the most galvanized in their opposition to new method schools were the teachers whose earnings and prestige were most threatened by the arrival of new method education to their locality.

Jadid and community leadership politics

While economic issues and the appearance of famine in the region played an important role in exacerbating tensions between new method teachers and non-Jadid teachers (and Muslim communities), so too did political issues relating to the subject of Muslim community leadership after 1905. In particular, control over Muslim education was a matter that was of considerable concern to a larger cross-section of elite and non-elite Muslims. Indeed, the issue of educational reform would constitute one of the major concerns of Muslims—both elite and non-elite, both Jadid and non-Jadid—involved in Muslim politics from late 1904 onwards.

During and after the 1905 revolution, Jadids sought to use the introduction of mass education in Russia as an opportunity to gain control over the institutions of Muslim administration. While most Muslims supported the idea of greater administrative autonomy for the Muslim spiritual assemblies, there was nevertheless strong disagreement over the question of how the assemblies should be reformed and by whom. Jadids sought to use itifak, the “all-Russian Muslim” movement which became a political party in 1906, as a means to place Muslim education under the control of the Muslim assemblies and put the Muslim assemblies under the control of itifak. Divisions between Jadids and non-Jadids over the future of the Muslim assemblies was sharpest in the Volga-Ural region and (albeit to a lesser extent) the Crimea, where state intervention into Muslim affairs had been particularly sharp in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In general, the future of state institutions like the Muslim assemblies was of less concern to non-elite Muslims in the southern Caucasus, and still less so in the northern Caucasus and Central Asia.53

While the leadership of itifak was dominated by Jadids and Jadid sympathizers, a number of non-Jadids were also active in the movement’s activities. Non-Jadids
participated in the movement’s early meetings and stood as candidates for parliament and sat in the Duma as Ittifaq representatives, while the journal Din ve Ma’arifet – which was well-known for its opposition to Judaism – regularly praised Ittifaq’s communiqués to Muslim communities. Although relations between the leaders of Ittifaq and the leaders of the empire’s four Muslim spiritual assemblies were often strained and marked by suspicion, the leaders of the assemblies and the leaders of the Muslim political party in parliament were able to work together on a number of occasions, such as when they joined forces in opposing a new set of education regulations proposed by the government on March 31, 1907. The leaders of the spiritual assemblies had more clout with government officials than did the leaders of Ittifaq, but the Ittifaq leaders were the only Muslim representatives in a position to work legislation through parliament. As long as the Duma itself was considered an important institution, the Ittifaq movement (later party) was a force whose potential (if not actual) power could not be dismissed.

The relationship between the Ittifaq leadership and its non-Jadid supporters changed drastically in the wake of the Third Muslim Congress in Nizhny Novgorod in August 1906. By this time, Yusuf Akcura, who was the general-secretary of the movement and its chief of communications, was gaining increasing decision-making power within Ittifaq, and it was Akcura who successfully pressed for the movement to be transformed into a political party. By becoming a political party, argued Akcura, Ittifaq should also adopt a political platform, and therefore must move away from the spirit of inclusiveness which had dominated in the early days of the movement. Despite criticism even from the supporters of Jadid projects, who complained that the congress had been advertised and had not been properly advertised, and the strenuous protests of some of the Muslims attending, a very pro-Jadid program was adopted, one that also called for the Ittifaq party to be given unprecedented control over Muslim administration.

The party program endorsed at the Third Congress included, for example, an ambitious project regarding the establishment of a standardized (umumi) program of education for Muslim schools in every region of Russia. It included the creation of a standardized curriculum for Muslim madresses, something which had long been a feature of the idealized versions of Jadidist education described in the writings of Gasprinski and others. The establishment of teacher training schools was also planned, and teachers would have to take examinations in order to become licensed. Licensing would be the responsibility of the Orenburg Assembly, which would become a unified body consolidating all of Russian Muslims into a single institution.

In addition to creating teacher training schools and establishing examinations, the standardized educational program that was accepted at the Third Muslim Congress also called for Muslim schools to teach, “to the extent possible,” in the “common language” (umumi islan), or “Türk,” a proposal that was clearly influenced by Ismail Gasprinski, who had been campaigning for the adoption of a “common literary language” on the pages of Tercuman for most of 1906. The 1906 meeting also called for increasing Russian language courses in Muslim schools, a position that had long been supported by Jadids in spite of the fact that thousands of Muslims in the Volga-Ural region had been campaigning against mandatory Russian-language education for much of the previous twenty-five years. Even more galling to non-Jadid followers of Ittifaq, however, was the proposal, also accepted at this congress, that “all Russian Muslims will be educated according to the new method.”

Indeed, for many people in attendance, the Third Muslim Congress represented the final victory of Jadidism over traditional education. In the triumphant words of one delegate to the congress, the new method teacher Ahmedcan Mustafa, “the battle over usul-i cedid is over.”

No fear remains. The fantasy that usul-i cedid would harm religion did frighten people, but now they understand that it is harmless. So, we must now try as hard as possible to reform our schools, and if we do not, we will force the Jaddis to move forward.

According to the program of the Third Congress, the Muslim spiritual assemblies were also scheduled to undergo major changes. The four assemblies would continue to exist, but would be subsumed within a single body, which would be concerned with the affairs of both Shiite and Sunni Muslims across the empire. The head of this body would be called the sheikh ul-Islam, who would be elected to a five-year term. Muslim judges, or kadis, would also be elected to five-year terms. Moreover, both the sheikh ul-Islam and the kadis would be assisted in their duties by a lawyer trained in Russian civil law – that is, by an individual who, by training, was considered more likely to be sympathetic to the proposals of the Jadid intellectuals who dominated the leadership of the Ittifaq party.

Following the Third Congress, Muslim opposition to Ittifaq increased considerably, with lower-level spiritual personnel in the Orenburg Assembly constituting the center of this opposition. According to Din ve Ma’arifet, a group of imams from villages in the vicinity of Orenburg had sent a telegram to the Interior Ministry in St. Petersburg about Ittifaq, and arguing that its policies concerning Muslim education and turning the mullahs into an elected position were contrary to Islam. Meanwhile, the pro-Ittifaq and pro-Jadid Muslim periodical press also began reporting that Muslim spiritual personnel were supporting right-wing monarchist parties, such as the Union of Russian People (Sozial Russkogo naroda).

Anti-Jadid denunciation campaign

Beginning in 1908, Muslim spiritual personnel undertook denunciation campaigns in which they reported to police, either in person or anonymously, that new method teachers were secretly spreading “pan-Turkist” or “pan-Islamist” propaganda. In August of 1908, a petition signed by twelve imams from the Orenburg Assembly was sent to the Minister of the Interior. The imams were complaining about what they described as the “revolutionary activities” of new method teachers in the area. Emphasizing the special relationship shared between the Russian government and the regional spiritual authorities in the definition and policing of
new method rivals. In these depositions, the mullahs claimed that new method figures, both famous and of purely local renown, were pan-Islamists and pan-Turkists plotting to territorially separate Muslim lands from the Russian Empire. Some of these denunciations (donosy), like the one submitted in 1908 by the twelve imams, incorporated the characteristics of Jadidism into a broader argument concerning risks to the established order. Those which were associated with Ishmi Ishan, on the other hand, focused more closely upon Jadidism itself. Some denunciations, in fact, focused exclusively upon the evils of Jadidism for two or three paragraphs before finally getting around to mentioning that the Jadids in question were actually “pan-Turkists,” and therefore of danger to not only Muslim communities, but also the Russian state.

Denunciations were made about both famous Jadids and local new method medrese teachers. In 1911, for example, Ahmet Faiz Dautov and Mirdad Iunusov, both teachers in the village of Sarapol, informed police rotmistr Budagosski that among a group of people “spreading the idea of pan-Islamism” among Muslims were prominent Jadid and Iftik figures such as Shaki Tukaiev, Sadi Makusdi, Ali Mérjan bey Topçhisiev, Yusuf Akcura, and Aliisgar Sirtlanov. Other denunciations implicated not only well-known Jadids, but also recently graduated teachers from large Jadid medreses such as the Galiev Medrese in Kazan and the Bubi Medrese of Tiunter.

The individuals named in these denunciations were usually identified as having committed similar types of offenses. Usually, their alleged activities involved some sort of plan to entice Muslims to separate territorially from Russia. Samigulla Makhisulov told a police officer in the province of Viahtka that some of the new method mullahs in Malmyzhuuki weds were spreading rumors and agitation among Muslims in the region. The Jadids, said Makhisulov, were telling people, “Muslims need to have their own ruler elected in three years by Muslims.” New method teachers, he charged, “want all Muslims to leave the subjection of the Russian Emperor and unite with Turkey.” Meanwhile, a licensed mullah in the Orenburg Assembly named Bilal Muzafarov made a similar charge against Nazip Kamaledinov, a new method teacher and mullah in the village of Musa Kabak. In his deposition to the police, Muzafarov implicated both his local rival, Kamaledinov, as well as the well-known Jadid Muhammadcan Galiev, who had been active in promoting new method education in Kazan since the 1880s.

Kamaledinov had become familiar with the new method from a Mullah Galiev in Kazan. I can’t remember his first name. He says Tatars needed to separate themselves from Russians. This came from the influence of the Kazan Mullah Galiev, who studied in Turkey, to which Galiev has traveled a number of times over an extended period of time.

While these denunciations were often directed against specific individuals (usually new method teachers) residing in or nearby the communities where those making the denunciations themselves lived, many of these denunciations also included the names of several figures from the Iftik leadership. In early 1911,
for example, an imam named Samigulla Mukhilsulin reported to the police that Abdullah Apanaev had been telling Muslims at the Muslim congresses that Russian Muslims “should live under the Turkish Sultan, not the Russian Tsar,” and that Abdullah Babi advocated that Tatars elect a padişah of their own and separate from Russia. In July of that year, Ishmiohmät Dinnömäht himself informed the police that “the main spreaders of pan-Islamist propaganda” were Abdürrüşşed Ibrahimov, Sadrettin Maksudov, Gālīmac Gațev, Abdullah Apanaev, Yiysuf Akça, Ali Mërdan Bay Topçuβașev, the Babi brothers, and Fath Kerimi. These denunciations resulted in far-reaching police investigations and the arrest of many of the individuals they implicated. In 1911, the Babi Medresse was shut down on suspicions that it had become a “pan-Islamist” breeding ground, while figures such as Gațev, Akça, Fath Kerimi, and many of the village medreses named in the denunciations were arrested, or else came under increased surveillance and investigation.

While it may be tempting to dismiss the ijtihād party due to its general lack of success in passing important legislation in parliament, it is more important to remember how this movement appeared to Muslims—particularly in the Volga-Ural region, where political engagement among Muslims was strongest—in the early months and years of the revolution. In an era in which many Russian subjects of all faiths were looking to parliament to implement social and legal change in the empire, the ijtihād movement had originally been viewed by a large cross-section of Muslims—Jādid and otherwise—as constituting the voice of Muslims in parliament. For as long as parliament itself appeared to be a strong institution in Russia, there seemed to be a genuine possibility that the Jādids who led ijtihād would succeed in carrying out their reforms. Efforts by the ijtihād leadership at the August 1906 Congress to impose new method education upon Muslims—no matter how fruitless these efforts would ultimately prove—thus struck many traditional teachers as a credible threat. While there were several factors contributing to the decline of the ijtihād party, including the adoption of a more moderate, election-law-based political stance by the Jādids and the Medreses, the provincial authorities themselves took notice of a rise in Muslim opposition to the party. In the elections to the third and fourth Dumas, the number of ijtihād representatives elected from the Volga-Ural region would drop steadily.

**Muslim cultural reform in the southern Caucasus**

Compared to the Volga-Ural region and the Crimea, circumstances concerning Muslim education in the southern Caucasus were quite different, especially as there was a much smaller number of new method schools in the province of Baku at the turn of the century than in the other two regions. After 1905, however, new method education in the southern Caucasus increased, though not at the pace seen in the Volga-Ural region or the Crimea. New schools opening in the southern Caucasus tended to be located in big cities like Baku, Tbilisi, and Yerevan, or else in towns like Shuşa or Shekki. In this respect, the expansion of new method education in the southern Caucasus likewise differed from that of the Volga-Ural region and the Crimea, where growth in new method education after 1905 was characterized by rapid expansion not only in big cities, but also in villages.

One of the most important reasons behind the comparatively slow pace of new method expansion in the southern Caucasus stemmed from the relative lack of freedom in the region. Due to the greater powers afforded to the vice-regency of the Caucasus in the aftermath of the labor unrest and armed Armenian-Muslim conflict which occurred during the years 1902–06, far more controls were placed upon organized activity than in the Volga-Ural region or the Crimea. Thus, while in the Volga-Ural region Jadids were able to open hundreds of schools without official permission, supporters of new method education and community reform in the Caucasus were more closely monitored and circumscribed in their actions. New method schools opening in the southern Caucasus after 1905 tended to be opened by officially sanctioned organizations which described the schools as “Russian-Tatar” educational facilities which taught literacy in both Russian and Turkish. Because the organizations establishing new method schools usually worked through official channels, fewer schools were opened and it took more time in order to gain official approval for opening them.

Within Muslim communities, new method education was a far less controversial issue in the southern Caucasus than it was in other regions of Russia. Unlike the Volga-Ural region and the Crimea, where even very poor villages often had a teacher of their own, in the Caucasus there were many villages, even in the relatively central province of Baku, with no nearby school or teacher. While Jadids in the Volga-Ural region often upset existing teachers and communities alike by moving into communities where teachers were already working, in the southern Caucasian communities were often grateful to be provided with any teacher at all. Consequently, in the southern Caucasian new method schools tended to be founded in communities where local inhabitants actually wanted to host them.

In the southern Caucasus, supporters of new method education made much more of an effort to reach out to traditional teachers working in village medreses than workers in the Crimea or the Volga-Ural region. According to a report written by an official working in the Baku branch of the Interior Ministry, supporters of new method education in Baku had been in contact with more traditionally-minded teachers in the hinterlands with offers of support. These offers were made in exchange for a promise from traditional teachers to allow new method teachers to work part time at the schools, where they would teach literacy and, if possible, Russian language.

Without doubt there has been enmity between the reformers and the mullahs. However, the reformers are trying to gradually bring the spiritual personnel and kadis over to their side and with their financial support reform the religious schools a little bit, disseminate their program, carry out education through the oral method and, in this way, slowly but surely realize their goals.

One of the best-known organizations promoting literacy in Baku was Neşır-i Maarif, which was established in 1908 by the Baku millionaire Abdul Zeynal
The director of *Nəşr-i Maarif* was Ağmet Ağaoğlu, who was also active in İtipfak and was a well-known publicist whose articles appeared in *Qəzət*, *Həzir*, and *İtfik*. In some ways, the efforts of this organization to promote literacy among Muslims in the southern Caucasus is comparable to the activities of Jādids in the Volga-Ural region, and in the historiography of Azerbaijan *Nəşr-i Maarif* is generally celebrated for its reformist activities and as an Azeri variant of "Jadidism."28 Yet there were also many differences between *Nəşr-i Maarif*'s activities and those of the Jādids in the Volga-Ural region.

*Nəşr-i Maarif* operated a relatively small number of schools. In 1908 the organization operated a teachers' school, a temporary literacy course for adults, and three other schools in Baku. In 1911, *Nəşr-i Maarif* opened another eleven schools, including three more in Baku and another eight in villages elsewhere in the province.29 These schools were all opened officially, and all paperwork regarding the teachers working there and the types of classes taught at the school was passed on to the inspector for Muslim schools in the province.30 Whereas teaching applicants contact cultural power brokers in the Volga-Ural region like Gəzər Xerimli often emphasized their ideological activism and belief in the Jādidi cause more generally, prospective teachers sending in lists of references and teaching experience did not invoke national slogans in appealing for work, but rather emphasized their teaching qualifications and need for employment.31 Salaries were good, but not as high as in the Volga-Ural region, with teachers working for *Nəşr-i Maarif* earning between 400 and 500 rubles per year.

Economic issues were connected to political ones. While there had already been a variety of reasons, opposition to new modern education in the years preceding the 1905 revolution, the expansion of Jādidi education in the years after 1905 exacerbated these divisions. The Third Muslim Congress of August 1906 signaled the transformation of İtipfak from a coalition of various Muslim interests into a narrower vehicle for Muslim cultural reform. Although in hindsight it may appear obvious that İtipfak lacked the political strength and organizational capacity to execute the plans of Akşura and others concerning the expansion of new method education and the reorganization of the Muslim spiritual assemblies, at the time these developments took place such a direction was not necessarily obvious to alarmed, and often hungry, spiritual personnel. That the denunciation of Jādids as "pan-Turkists" by spiritual personnel began in earnest in 1909—the same year in which the famine became more desperate—hardly appears in this light to have been a coincidence.

Conclusions

Differences among Muslims with respect to the movement for Muslim cultural reform were not limited solely to the arguments and ideas of well-known activ- ist-intellectuals, but also were closely bound up with much more tangible matters pertaining to economics and political power within Muslim communities. Traditional teachers resisted the expansion of new method schools in their villages not only to protect their cultural capital, but also in defense of their actual capital—
not use this name among themselves, and that the term was generally used as an epithet by Jajads. Ibrahim Marap, Türk Dünyasında Dini Yenileşme, 1850–1917 (Istanbul: İstanbul, 2002), 22.

3 By far, the most original and important study on the Jajads to have emerged in many years is Adeb Khalif, 'The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jajidism in Central Asia' (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). One of the main benefits of this study lies in nuanced reformulation of a narrative that had long been quite hagiographical with respect to Jajads and generally dismissive of the concerns of their opponents.


6 "Türkic" (Türki), was the language in which Ismail Gaspirli wanted Muslim text books to be printed. See later in this chapter.

7 Adeb Khalif perceptively notes the tendency within an earlier generations of scholarly literature to uncritically adopt the Jajads’ own rhetoric concerning traditional education. Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform, 1850–1917, 7–8.

8 Lazarin, "Ismail Bey Gaspirli," 188–189.


10 See Munir Isupov, Galimdhamb Barudi (Kazan: Taşgana knizhnoe izd-v, 2002), 60–102. On Barudi, also see Yusaf Akcura, Damiya Galimchun Al-Barudi (Kazan: Serif Matbaas, 1967).
The economics of Muslim cultural reform


49 This was particularly the case in the Caucasus. "Uçüncü ıttihat Rusya müslüman Kürana da," İrade 197, August 21, 1906. Ali Merdan Bey Topçabeyev was one of the chairmen with this congress, but Topçabeyev had spent most of his time since 1905 in Petersburg. Muslims who had stayed in Baku throughout the Armenian-Muslim fighting and its aftermath included Ahmet Bey Ağcağul and Ali Bey Hüseyînîn: Ağcağul, in particular, was involved in a number of activities devoted to community welfare, and was appointed to the Muslim side of the peace talks sponsored by the regional vice-regency.


51 Ibid., 60–61.

52 Ibid., 76–77.

53 See, for example, Lazzerini, "İsmail Bey Gaspirskını," 211–213. Gaspirskini had been the most prominent Muslim reformer calling for the establishment of a "common literary language" (known as Türkî) since early 1906. For more on the so-called "language issue," see Meyer, "Turkic Worlds," 203–206.

54 Indeed, İsmail Gaspirskini and Abdurrahim İbrahim had advocated the study of Russian among Muslims for decades.


56 1906 senesinde 16–21 August’da, 84–85.

57 Ibid., 70.


59 Ibid., 124–125.

60 İrade 19, May 25, 1907, 297–299.

61 "Zamanlar türkçe bit elindeildi!" İrade 19, 299–300.


63 ROA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, II, 55–56.

64 ROA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, II, 45–56.

65 ROA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, II, 55–56.

66 İsmîhâmînîn Dinînînîmâtî (1849–1919) was a muffawir who ran a school in the village of Trümen. See "İsmîhâmînîn Dinînînîmâtî," Tahtaren Etnografikda Sâzîçele, 202.

67 See, for example, NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, esp. ll, 67. On complaints regarding the denominations, see "Ulemağa garızı," Bılbı’t-ul-hak 25 and "Mühim bir meleze," Bılbı’t-ul-hak 32.

68 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 52; f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 246; f. 199, op. 1, d. 795, l. 192; f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 67.

69 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 675, ll, 17–18.

70 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, ll, 33–34.

71 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 67. Other denominations can be found in NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 66; f. 199, op. 1, d. 785, ll, 18; f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, ll, 58, 67, 69, 88, 99, 101, 103, 114–115, 116–118, 251–261, 288–89, 323–324, 331–334, 336–346; f. 199, op. 1, d. 795, ll, 30, 83, 92.

72 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, ll, 33–34.

73 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, ll, 92.

74 For investigations into Bılbı’t, see NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 675, ll, 26–33; ROA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, ll, 84–94.

75 See, especially, NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 675, ll, 34, 37, 43, 55, 69, 76, 83, 175; f. 199,

fact that the villagers in question were doing well, harvesting up to 500 maud per year from their own fields. Without financial or other forms of material support from the village, Abdulla feared that he would be unable to feed his family. Central State Archive of the Republic of Bashkortostan (TSGA RBA), f. 1-295, op. 10, d. 205, ll. 130–131. A pound was equal to 16-18 kilograms.

29 For the original document detailing the plans for assistance, see Kazan State University Lobachevsky Library, Department of Rare Books and Manuscripts (KSU), Document 1-1235, "Orenburg duktur almane sobranieseng enkökutters tarafinsan birilmish ssusdaları, möre扎k islamgarwa ualshfa bin hakadiwa iederi." Ufa, 1909. On the difficult conditions of Muslim spiritual figures in the Volga-Ural region, see: "İsmâ’llâhül huame bir nazar," İrade 16, May 4, 1907, 253–254. Also see Nagawara Norihito, "Molding the Muslim Community through the Tourist Administration: Mahalîa under the Jurisdiction of the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly after 1905," Acta Slavica Iaponica 23 (2006), 114.


31 Mağlûmat 15, August 15, 1908, p. 333.

32 ROA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 626, ll, 12.

33 NART, f. 160, op. 1, d. 1576, l. 3.


35 TSGA RBA, f. 1-295, op. 11, d. 205, ll, 279.

36 TSGA RBA, f. 1-295, op. 11, d. 523, esp. ll, 152–159.

37 GAARK, f. 100, op. 1, d. 2374, l. 87.

38 GAARK, f. 100, op. 1, d. 2374, ll, 79–81.

39 GAARK, f. 100, op. 1, d. 2374, ll, 83–87.

40 Kerimi was the editor of the Orenburg newspaper Kızık and was closely involved in Jadîd projects in the region.

41 This is the family of Yusuf Akçura, later Akçura.

42 NART, f. 1370, op. 1, d. 20, ll, 21–23.

43 Allen Frank makes this argument, but bases his conclusions upon a single manuscript relating to just one district. Allen Frank, Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia: The Islamic, World of Novorossiysk District and the Kazakh Inner Horde, 1789–1910 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 315.

44 Non-elite Muslims living in regions where the assemblies had longer institutional roots – the Volga-Ural region and Crimea in particular – were far more involved in discussions and political maneuvering relating to the future of the assemblies than was the case in the southern Caucasus. In the northern Caucasus and Central Asia, such institutions did not exist at all.

45 Haydarhall Usmanov, an okhund from Orenburg who was appointed to the position of kadi in 1906, sat in parliament as an Itifakî member and became the fraction’s parliametary secretary. While contributing articles to the Jadîdîst press (such as Fatih Kerimi’s Kızık newspaper), he was also a regular contributor to the anti-Jadîd İrade ve Magzûr, where he addressed petitions he received from Muslim spiritual personnel who were angry about Itifakî’s education policies. Usmanov was hardly the person from the non-Jadîd ulama to sit in parliament as an Itifakî representative. See Meyer, "Turkic Worlds." 164–165.

46 On relations between the Itifakî leadership and Mûfti Soltanov of the Orenburg Assembly, see Meyer, "Turkic Worlds," 151–156. On tensions between Gaspirskini and Mûfti Kâzım Kasınski of the Tavirdîn Assembly, see 156–159. On tensions in the southern Caucasus between community activists and spiritual assembly leaders, see 169–162.

47 The list of articles that were changed as a result of these negotiations is published in "31 mart pravilasi," Urâl 3, January 5, 1907. On the March 31 Regulations, also see Bılbı’t-ul-hak Esatçali, 236–238.
The Alash Orda’s relations with Siberia, the Urals, and Turkestan

The Kazakh national movement and the Russian imperial legacy

UYAMA Tomohiko

The study of the national movements that arose during the Russian Revolution and Russian Civil War was popular in the first half of the 1990s, but it seems to have gone out of fashion. Western, Russian, and Japanese scholars are busy studying the institutional, confessional, and mental-geographical aspects of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Scholars in Central Eurasia are more concerned with the glorious history of the premodern heroes and dynasties that are thought to prove the historical legitimacy of their countries’ statehoods. This is unfortunate, as there is much interesting source material on the history of national movements that remains understudied. The use of this field should be revived.

Needless to say, it is naive to view national movements as something that could have built an alternative to the “evil empire” of the Soviet Union, but this is exactly how some Western scholars view these movements during the Cold War. There is no basis for regarding leaders of national movements as direct heirs to the rebels who fought against Russian expansion (as some Kazakh scholars do) or as throwbacks to feudal rulers (as some Russian scholars do). What is common to these approaches is their treatment of national movements as something opposite or alien to tsarist Russia. However, the February and October Revolutions did not change everything instantly, and it is reasonable to assume that national movements were affected by the legacy of the Russian Empire.

The influence of the Russian Empire on national movements can be divided into two aspects: the style of work of non-Russian leaders and the environment of their activities. I have elsewhere pointed out that paternalism and authoritarianism were mixed with a highly ethical and self-sacrificing attitude in the thoughts and deeds of Kazakh intellectuals during the tsarist and Revolutionary eras. These intellectuals thought they were obligated to protect, lead, and command ordinary people. This can largely be explained by their style of discourse, which was influenced by the Kazakh tradition of didactic literature, and by the need to minimize disorder in times of turbulence. However, it is probable that they were also influenced by the style of work of tsarist officials, especially the protectionism and paternalism that characterized nineteenth-century officials such as Gerashim Kolpakovskii (the first Steppe governor-general) and Konstantin von Kaufman (the first Turkestan governor-general). After the turn of the century, paternalistic policies were largely