

New Horizons in Islamic Studies (Second Series)

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This second series of 'New Horizons in Islamic Studies' presents the abundant results of the National Institutes for the Humanities (NIHU) program for Islamic Area Studies (IAS) carried out in Japan from 2006 to date. This program emphasizes multidisciplinary research on the dynamism of Muslim societies, in both Islamic and non-Islamic areas around the world. By taking a historical approach and adopting regional comparison methods in the study of current issues, the program seeks to build a framework of empirical knowledge on Islam and Islamic Civilization.

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This publication of the results of our IAS joint research has and will have been made possible through the collaborative efforts of the five IAS centers, and with the financial assistance of the NIHU and the MEXT.

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First published 2012 by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
711 Third Ave, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 978-0-415-61537-2 (hbk)
ISBN 978-0-203-63874-3 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman by Swales & Willis Ltd, Exeter, Devon

**Since the publication of the last volume in the series, the
original editor Prof. SATO Tsugitaka has passed away.
His dedication and vision for the series will be missed by
all who were privileged to work with him.**



Printed and bound in Great Britain by
TJI Digital, Padstow, Cornwall

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Money, power and Muslim communities in late imperial Russia

James H. MEYER

The movement for Muslim cultural reform, or “Jadidism,” has long been a popular subject of investigation in the historiography relating to Muslim communities in late imperial Russia. While scholars have examined Jadidism in different ways over the years, in most cases the movement for Muslim cultural reform has been discussed mainly in terms of the “ideas” of a rather small number of well-known activist-intellectuals.¹ Muslim opposition to Jadidism, meanwhile, has likewise been discussed primarily in terms of the “arguments” and “debates” taking place in the Muslim periodical press between Jadids and their conservative rivals, often referred to as “Qadims.”² Although idea-based approaches to Jadidism have at times provided valuable insights into subjects like the nature of elite rivalries in Muslim communities,³ at the same time such approaches can also leave the impression that the issue of Muslim cultural reform was something that concerned only a relatively small number of people.⁴

This chapter examines the movement for Muslim cultural reform beyond the margins of the periodical press. Rather than discuss “Jadidism” as an abstract concept, I focus upon individual Jadids, their projects, and the responses of other Muslims to these projects. By using state archival sources and other materials that have traditionally not been employed in studies of Jadidism, I look at the ways in which the movement for Muslim cultural reform played out in the mud-spattered villages and obscure schools which constituted, in many ways, the front lines in the culture wars taking place within Muslim communities in the late imperial era. While intellectual debates and “cultural capital” no doubt constituted important components in these battles,⁵ divisions within Muslim communities over the post-1905 expansion of Jadidist education also stemmed from much more tangible concerns, including those related to money and power. Focusing comparatively upon three distinct geographical areas of the empire, I argue that the activities of the Jadids—while often rejected by non-elite Muslims—nevertheless mattered to a community of Muslims far larger than the narrow circle of activists with whom these projects are normally associated. The activities of the Jadids mattered to many non-elite Muslims because reform projects, in addition to reflecting “ideas” over which elite Muslims debated, also impinged directly upon a variety of issues related to more tangible concerns, including those related to money and political power, that were of interest to a much broader cross-section of Muslims.

Muslim education and the expansion of Jadidism

In a number of ways, the movement for Muslim cultural reform resembled cultural and intellectual movements taking place in Muslim communities throughout the Middle East and beyond.⁶ While Muslim cultural reformers in Russia and elsewhere embraced a variety of reform positions, the Jadid movement was associated mainly with the issue of educational reform. Jadids advocated the teaching of literacy, usually in the form of local vernaculars or in “Turkic,”⁷ and were critical of traditional Muslim educational approaches which emphasized the acquisition of skills such as the memorization and recitation of sacred texts written in Arabic.⁸ Jadids also favored the introduction of what they considered to be more “orderly” approaches to Muslim education, advocating the stricter regulation of both space and time by seating students in rows and dividing the day into separate periods devoted to the study of different subjects. Notably, the teaching of Russian was also supported by most Jadids, as well as the study of secular subjects alongside religious ones. Schools and teachers which subscribed to such approaches were known in Russia as adhering to the “new method,” or *usul-i cedid*.⁹

The best-known Muslim cultural reform figure in Russia was Ismail Gasprinskii. Gasprinskii not only wanted to change the manner of Muslim education through the teaching of literacy, but also hoped to overhaul the entire culture of Muslim education in Russia. In the 1880s and 1890s, Gasprinskii traveled frequently across the Crimea, the Volga-Ural region, and Central Asia in his efforts to popularize new method education.¹⁰ Elsewhere, other Jadids, such as Rizaeddin Fahreddin, Galimcan Barudi and Musa Bigi, opened schools in the Volga-Ural region, mostly in urban areas, such as Kazan, Chistopol, and Orenburg.¹¹ In the southern Caucasus, meanwhile, a small number of new method schools were opened in the largest of cities, such as Tbilisi, Baku, and Yerevan. By 1895, Gasprinskii surmised that there existed a little over one hundred new method schools in all of Russia.¹²

Estimates relating to the number of new method schools in Russia vary, particularly with regard to the growth in number of new method schools taking place after 1905. Indeed, in this respect – as is the case regarding many other aspects of Muslim life in imperial Russia – tsarist state estimates were often wildly off the mark and frequently contradicted one another. In 1909, for example, officials in Orenburg indicated that there were no new method schools operating in their province,¹³ whereas sources written in the languages of Muslim communities themselves indicate that the province of Orenburg was actually one of the major centers of new method activity in Russia.¹⁴ In another government report from 1909, it was stated that in the province of Kazan there were only 191 new method schools out of a total of 913 Muslim schools in the province.¹⁵ This finding contradicted the opinion of a separate report, written in the same year, which stated that in the province of Kazan “up to 90 percent of all Muslim confessional schools are currently run according to the new method.”¹⁶

The confusion of tsarist officials over the numbers of new method schools stemmed from several factors. First of all, most tsarist officials who worked on issues pertaining to Muslims could not read or communicate in the languages of the empire's Muslim populations, and knew little or nothing about the Muslim communities in the empire. Second, the schools themselves were often short-lived, while the degree to which these schools followed new method educational programs also varied. The fact that many new method schools had been opened without official government permission was also a major factor in sowing confusion among tsarist officials charged with tracking the growth of new method education.

In the Crimea, for example, tsarist officials – working with the Crimean Müfti – undertook a survey in 1908 of schools in the province and found that in one of its *uezds* “only eight out of 126 *mekteps* were operating with the permission of the Muslim spiritual assembly.”¹⁷ Meanwhile, the number of illegal Muslim schools in the Crimea was estimated at “more than 600” in an August 1910 article appearing in the journal *Sotrudnik*.¹⁸ In 1912, a study on new method education in the province of Kazan found that the great majority of new method schools opened since the placement of Muslim schools under the authority of the Ministry of Education in 1870 had been opened illegally.¹⁹

While dependable figures relating to the expansion of new method education are difficult to come by, tsarist officials were nevertheless consistent in detecting a considerable spike in the number of new method schools in the years following the Revolution of 1905. In 1909, the director of Tatar, Bashkir, and “Kirgiz [Kazakh]” education in the province of Kazan wrote that the “fermentation” (*brozhenie*) of new method education in the province had begun in earnest only in 1906, with most new method schools having been established only “recently, about 3–4 years ago.”²⁰ In 1905, the Russian Orientalist Agafangel Krymskii estimated that there were approximately five hundred new method schools operating in the whole of Russia. Within three years he had increased his estimate by more than ten times, to six thousand.²¹

Meanwhile, demand in Russia for experienced teachers in the new method approach attracted many teachers from the Ottoman Empire, where new method approaches to the teaching of literacy had been standard practice since the era of the *Tanzimat*.²² Many Russian Muslims, moreover, chose to study in the Ottoman Empire because they felt that they would receive better training in Istanbul and other Ottoman cities than in Russia.²³ Muslim community activist figures from Russia who were living in Istanbul after 1908 would sometimes help their young protégés secure work as new method teachers in Russia,²⁴ while Russian Muslim students in Istanbul themselves often contacted wealthy or connected Jadid figures in Russia, asking for assistance with their education.²⁵

The economics of Muslim cultural reform

Although conditions at new method schools could vary substantially with respect to resources,²⁶ teachers working at the more prestigious new method schools in cities like Kazan, Ufa, and Simferopol often received salaries that traditional *medrese* teachers could only dream of. The contrast could be stark. Most

traditional *medrese* teachers were lower-level personnel in the Muslim spiritual assemblies who received no fixed salary, and teaching the village's children often represented one of their few opportunities to earn cash.²⁷ Otherwise, compensation to spiritual personnel consisted mainly of in-kind payments such as an allotment of the village's harvest or else a small plot of land upon which they could grow their own food, arrangements which could be quickly overturned during periods of famine.²⁸ And famine would indeed strike during the years following the 1905 Revolution. Beginning no later than 1909, Müfti Soltanov of the Orenburg Assembly appealed on numerous occasions to government authorities in an effort to receive funding to help Muslim spiritual personnel buy food. These requests were only met in 1912, when the government agreed to provide the Orenburg Assembly with a loan of 50,000 rubles to feed spiritual personnel considered to be in danger of starvation.²⁹

Even as spiritual personnel were going hungry, the merchants who established some of the most prestigious new method schools during these years were offering salaries that sometimes seemed exorbitant by comparison. Salaries among teachers at the Hüseyiniye *Medrese* in Kargalı (Qarghali), established by Ahmet Bey Hüseyinov in 1903, averaged 336 rubles per year in 1903–05, and almost 400 rubles per year in 1913–14.³⁰ A 1908 job advertisement for teachers at the new method *Medrese-yi Usmaniye* in Ufa offered monthly salaries ranging from 10 to 25 rubles, depending on the applicant's qualifications.³¹ In 1910, an official in the Department of Spiritual Affairs observed that “unlike teachers in traditional [‘old method,’ or *starometodnyi*] schools, all of the teachers [in new method schools] receive a predetermined salary, ranging from 100 to 700 rubles per year, or even more, depending on the specific qualifications and experience of the teacher,”³² while other reports estimated these salaries at between 200 and 600 rubles per year.³³ Meanwhile, other remunerative opportunities for new method teachers came in the form of stipends and grants (sometimes as much as 500 rubles) provided for projects such as the production of new textbooks, with money provided by philanthropists such as the Hüseyinov brothers.³⁴

Faced with the arrival of new method teachers in their villages, traditional teachers fought back, appealing to the Orenburg Assembly and civil officials in efforts to have recently opened new method schools closed down. In 1906, for example, an imam named Mehmed Zakir Abdürrahimoğlu from the village of Bik Shikte in the province of Simbirsk wrote to the Orenburg Assembly to complain that his students had been stolen from him. While Abdürrahimoğlu had been in Ufa on business pertaining to the Orenburg Assembly, the village *muezzin*, Mehmed Arif Alimoğlu, had set up a new method school in his absence, and Abdürrahimoğlu now turned to the Orenburg Assembly in his effort to get the school closed down.³⁵

In a similar case in 1912, the Orenburg Assembly ruled on two complaints that had been made in 1909 regarding the teaching of an Imam Beyazitov at a *medrese* in the village of Sair-Novyi. The school in the village, it was explained in the ruling, had been constructed on the specific condition that new method education would not take place there. Habibullah Hüseyinov, an imam in the village, had already driven away two teachers for teaching in the new method in 1907 and 1908, and

then attempted to drive away Beyazitov as well. In 1909, both Hüseyinov and his co-plaintiff, “the wife of İmankulov” (the widow of an earlier teacher), appealed to the Orenburg Assembly to remove Beyazitov from the school. In his defense, Beyazitov acknowledged that he had indeed originally taught according to the new method. However, he said, he had switched to traditional methods of teaching in the face of opposition from the community. The assembly concluded that, while “it is not the place for the Orenburg Assembly to determine the correct style of education for children, the complaints of Hüseyinov and the wife of İmankulov do not appear to be well founded,” and ruled that Beyazitov should be allowed to stay at the school.³⁶

On some occasions, tensions were created within a community when Jadids attempted to open a new method school in a community where a school already existed. In the Crimean city of Karasubazar, an organization calling itself the “Muslim charitable organization of Karasubazar” requested permission from the Simferopol inspector for non-Russian education to open a new method *mektep* “with the goal of teaching Russian language.” The school, they wrote, would be located in the building where a government operated Russian-Tatar school currently existed.³⁷ Students attending the existing school, it was envisioned, would become students at the new Jadid school.

In response to this plan, a group of twenty-three “Tatar residents of the city of Karasubazar” petitioned the inspector in opposition to these plans, arguing that they could not afford to pay money for their children’s education, something which was required at the new method school. The fees demanded by the school, they argued, were too expensive and would “serve only a small portion (*neznachitel'naia chast'*) of the population.”³⁸ In October, supporters of the new method school wrote again to the inspector. As was the case with the new method school’s opponents, the school’s supporters invoked the community in advocating their position by writing “the community is very pleased by the opening of the new method schools by the Muslim Charitable Society.”³⁹

Sometimes, opponents of new method teachers would take matters into their own hands, running a new method teacher out of town or threatening him with violence. In March 1909, Fatih Kerimi⁴⁰ received a letter from an imam in Tiumen named Selim Giray bin Khayri al-din Gabidov. Gabidov was a new method teacher who had spent nearly two years on the educational front. After studying in Kazan, Gabidov had taken a teaching job outside Penza at a school sponsored by the Akçurin family of Simbirsk.⁴¹ Before long, however, a coalition of “old rich people” (*kart baylar*) and “old mullahs who were trying to close the school” managed to convince enough people to withdraw their children, forcing the school to shut down. From Penza, Gabidov traveled to Tiumen, where he again taught according to the new method, this time thanks to the sponsorship of a local merchant. In his letter to Kerimi, Gabidov describes once being descended upon by a mob of “forty to fifty” people demanding he leave town. Nevertheless, he wrote that he had met with some success in Tiumen, developing seven groups of students and earning between 5 and 10 rubles per month cash, while his wife brought in still more money by teaching three classes of girls. However, wrote Gabidov, he and

his wife were forced to end their teaching activities due to the meddling of “the enemies of the community” (*milletke dushmannar*).⁴²

The relationship between Muslim communities and new method education was a complicated one. On the one hand, the number of new method schools increased exponentially after 1905, particularly in the Volga-Ural region and the Crimea. While many of these schools closed soon after they were opened, many others stayed open for years. Jadids working in the hinterlands often complained against the machinations of tyrannical mullahs who set the community against them, but in at least some cases it seems clear that new method schools failed either because of a lack of local interest in new method education more generally, or because of the shortcomings or lack of experience of the teachers employed at the school.⁴³ On some occasions entire villages, or at least significant portions of them, were actively involved in repelling new method teachers from a school or village, but in most cases the individuals who appear to have been the most galvanized in their opposition to new method schools were the teachers whose earnings and prestige were most threatened by the arrival of new method education to their locality.

Jadids and community leadership politics

While economic issues and the appearance of famine in the region played an important role in exacerbating tensions between new method teachers and non-Jadid teachers (and Muslim communities), so too did political issues relating to the subject of Muslim community leadership after 1905. In particular, control over Muslim education was a matter that was of considerable concern to a large cross-section of elite and non-elite Muslims. Indeed, the issue of educational reform would constitute one of the major concerns of Muslims—both elite and non-elite, both Jadid and non-Jadid—involved in Muslim politics from late 1904 onwards.

During and after the 1905 revolution, Jadids sought to use the introduction of mass politics in Russia as an opportunity to gain control over the institutions of Muslim administration. While most Muslims supported the idea of greater administrative autonomy for the Muslim spiritual assemblies, there was nevertheless strong disagreement over the question of how the assemblies should be reformed and by whom. Jadids sought to use *İttifak*, the “all-Russian Muslim” movement which became a political party in 1906, as a means to place Muslim education under the control of the Muslim assemblies and put the Muslim assemblies under the control of *İttifak*. Divisions between Jadids and non-Jadids over the future of the Muslim assemblies was sharpest in the Volga-Ural region and (albeit to a lesser extent) the Crimea, where state intervention into Muslim affairs had been particularly sharp in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In general, the future of state institutions like the Muslim assemblies was of less concern to non-elite Muslims in the southern Caucasus, and still less so in the northern Caucasus and Central Asia.⁴⁴

While the leadership of *İttifak* was dominated by Jadids and Jadid sympathizers, a number of non-Jadids were also active in the movement’s activities. Non-Jadids

participated in the movement's early meetings and stood as candidates for parliament and sat in the Duma as *Ittifak* representatives,⁴⁵ while the journal *Din ve Mağışet* – which was well-known for its opposition to Jadidism – regularly printed *Ittifak*'s communiqués to Muslim communities. Although relations between the leaders of *Ittifak* and the leaders of the empire's four Muslim spiritual assembly were often strained and marked by suspicion,⁴⁶ the leaders of the assemblies and the leaders of the Muslim political party in parliament were able to work together on a number of occasions, such as when they joined forces in opposing a new set of education regulations proposed by the government on March 31, 1907.⁴⁷ The leaders of the spiritual assemblies had more clout with government officials than did the leaders of *Ittifak*, but the *Ittifak* leaders were the only Muslim representatives in a position to work legislation through parliament. As long as the Duma itself was considered an important institution, the *Ittifak* movement (later party) was a force whose potential (if not actual) power could not be dismissed.

The relationship between the *Ittifak* leadership and its non-Jadid supporters changed drastically in the wake of the Third Muslim Congress in Nizhny Novgorod in August 1906. By this time, Yusuf Akçura, who was the general-secretary of the movement and its chief of communications, was gaining increasing decision-making power within *Ittifak*, and it was Akçura who successfully pressed for the movement to be transformed into a political party. By becoming a political party, argued Akçura, *Ittifak* should also adopt a political platform, and therefore must move away from the spirit of inclusiveness which had dominated in the early days of the movement.⁴⁸ Despite criticism even from the supporters of Jadid projects, who complained that the congress had not been properly advertised,⁴⁹ and amid the strenuous protests of some of the Muslims attending, a very pro-Jadid program was adopted, one that also called for the *Ittifak* party to be given unprecedented control over Muslim administration.

The party program endorsed at the Third Congress included, for example, an ambitious project regarding the establishment of a standardized (*umumi*) program of education for Muslim schools in every region of Russia.⁵⁰ This program envisioned the creation of a standardized curriculum for Muslim *medreses*, something which had long been a feature of the idealized versions of Jadidist education described in the writings of Gasprinskii and others. The establishment of teacher training schools was also planned, and teachers would have to take examinations in order to become licensed. Licensing would be the responsibility of the Orenburg Assembly, which would become a unified body consolidating all of Russian Muslims into a single institution.⁵¹

In addition to creating teacher training schools and establishing examinations, the standardized educational program that was accepted at the Third Muslim Congress also called for Muslim schools to teach, "to the extent possible," in the "common language" (*umumi lisan*), or "Türki,"⁵² a proposal that was clearly influenced by İsmail Gasprinskii, who had been campaigning for the adoption of a "common literary language" on the pages of *Tercüman* for most of 1906.⁵³ The 1906 meeting also called for increasing Russian language courses in Muslim schools,⁵⁴ a position that had long been supported by Jadids in spite of the fact that thousands

of Muslims in the Volga-Ural region had been campaigning against mandatory Russian-language education for much of the previous twenty-five years.⁵⁵ Even more galling to non-Jadid followers of *Ittifak*, however, was the proposal, also accepted at this congress, that "all Russian Muslims will be educated according to the new method."⁵⁶

Indeed, for many people in attendance, the Third Muslim Congress represented the final victory of Jadidism over traditional education. In the triumphant words of one delegate to the congress, the new method teacher Ahmedcan Mustafa, "the battle over *usul-i cedit* is over."

No fear remains. The fantasy that *usul-i cedit* would harm religion did frighten people, but now they understand that it is harmless. So, we must now try as hard as possible to reform our schools, and if we so endeavor we will accomplish these reforms.⁵⁷

According to the program of the Third Congress, the Muslim spiritual assemblies were also scheduled to undergo major changes. The four assemblies would continue to exist, but would be subsumed within a single body, which would be concerned with the affairs of both Shiite and Sunni Muslims across the empire. The head of this body would be called the *sheyh ul-Islam*, who would be elected to a five-year term.⁵⁸ Muslim judges, or *kadis*, would also be elected to five-year terms. Moreover, both the *sheyh ul-Islam* and the *kadis* would be assisted in their duties by a lawyer trained in Russian civil law – that is, by an individual who, by training, was considered more likely to be sympathetic to the proposals of the Jadid intellectuals who dominated the leadership of the *Ittifak* party.⁵⁹

Following the Third Congress, Muslim opposition to *Ittifak* increased considerably, with lower-level spiritual personnel in the Orenburg Assembly constituting the center of this opposition.⁶⁰ According to *Din ve Mağışet*, a group of imams from villages in the vicinity of Orenburg had sent a telegram to the Interior Ministry complaining about *Ittifak*, and arguing that its policies concerning Muslim education and turning the müftiate into an elected position were contrary to Islam.⁶¹ Meanwhile, the pro-*Ittifak* and pro-Jadid Muslim periodical press also began reporting that Muslim spiritual personnel were supporting right-wing monarchist parties, such as the Union of Russian People (*Soiuz Russkogo naroda*).⁶²

Anti-Jadid denunciation campaign

Beginning in 1908, Muslim spiritual personnel undertook denunciation campaigns in which they reported to police, either in person or anonymously, that new method teachers were secretly spreading "pan-Turkist" or "pan-Islamist" propaganda.⁶³ In August of 1908, a petition signed by twelve imams from the Orenburg Assembly was sent to the Minister of the Interior. The imams were complaining about what they described as the "revolutionary activities" of new method teachers in the area. Emphasizing the special relationship shared between the Russian government and the regional spiritual authorities in the definition and policing of

“Islam,” the imams began their petition by invoking the reliability and loyalty of the Orenburg authorities.

We Muslims pray every Friday for the long life both of our great Tsar and for its excellence the Russian government to which we are subjects. How could we not pray, given the fact that our great leader has granted us full freedom in our religious activities? He created the spiritual assembly for the appointment of imams, for the construction of mosques and *medreses*, and for the regulation of our religious affairs.

“In recent years,” wrote the mullahs, “a number of teachers belonging to revolutionary organizations” had appeared in their villages. “Though they are ostensibly undertaking a religious duty,” they wrote, “in fact they are turning the Tatar population against the Russian government.” The twelve mullahs wrote that the new *Medrese-i Muhammediye* of Kazan, one of the best known new method *medreses* in the region, “is producing teachers who teach children according to the new method, who train them by filling their blood with hatred for the government.”⁶⁴

The complaints of the twelve licensed mullahs seem to have been designed to place the question of new method education in a context that would attract as much attention as possible among security-conscious tsarist authorities. The mullahs wrote that teachers who studied at the *Medrese-i Muhammediye* wanted to say the Friday prayer in Tatar, “in accordance with the plan of the Young Turks and Persian mullahs.” The twelve mullahs also wrote that these teachers,

want to put the [Orenburg] Spiritual Assembly into Muslim hands and, having taken the Assembly out of the hands of the government, then hold elections for the position of müfti and for the *kadis* because they want to carry out through the assembly undertakings such as the publication by the assembly of newspapers and journals with the aim of creating evil in Tatar society.⁶⁵

The twelve mullahs named names, giving the first and last names of ten *Muhammediye* graduates as well as the village and *uezd* in which they lived. The mullahs requested that the government force the Orenburg Assembly to stop allowing graduates of the new method *Medrese-i Muhammediye* to teach in schools and that the government permit the Friday prayer to be read only in Arabic “just as prayers are read for Orthodox Christians in Slavonic.”

This was the first of what would ultimately constitute a wide-scale campaign of secret denunciations about new method figures in the Volga-Ural region, most of which were organized by an imam in the town of Tiunter named İshmöhämmät Dinmöhämmät (1849–1919). Dinmöhämmät, also known as İshmi İshan, was the author of a number of pamphlets denouncing new method teaching, and the new method Bubi *Medrese* of Tiunter in particular.⁶⁶ From 1909 to 1911, several dozen individual Muslims, most of them licensed mullahs from the Orenburg Assembly working in villages across the province of Kazan, wrote letters and, more frequently, visited police stations, to personally grant depositions denouncing their

new method rivals. In these depositions, the mullahs claimed that new method figures, both famous and of purely local renown, were pan-Islamists and pan-Turkists plotting to territorially separate Muslim lands from the Russian Empire. Some of these denunciations (*donosy*), like the one submitted in 1908 by the twelve imams, incorporated the characteristics of Jadidism into a broader argument concerning risks to the established order. Those which were associated with İshmi İshan, on the other hand, focused more closely upon Jadidism itself. Some denunciations, in fact, focused exclusively upon the evils of Jadidism for two or three paragraphs before finally getting around to mentioning that the Jadids in question were actually “pan-Turkists,” and therefore of danger to not only Muslim communities, but also the Russian state.⁶⁷

Denunciations were made about both famous Jadids and local new method *medrese* teachers. In 1911, for example, Ahmet Faiz Dautov and Mirsaid İnusov, both teachers in the village of Saropol, informed police *rotmistr* Budagoskii that among a group of people “spreading the idea of pan-Islamism” among Muslims were prominent Jadid and *İttifak* figures such as Shakir Tukaev, Sadri Maksudi, Ali Merdan bey Topçibaşev, Yusuf Akçura, and Aliasgar Sirtlanov.⁶⁸ Other denunciations implicated not only well-known Jadids, but also recently graduated teachers from large Jadid *medreses* such as the Galiev *Medrese* in Kazan and the Bubi *Medrese* of Tiunter.⁶⁹

The individuals named in these denunciations were usually identified as having committed similar types of offenses. Usually, their alleged activities involved some sort of plan to entice Muslims to separate territorially from Russia. Samigulla Makhlisullin told a police officer in the province of Viatka that some of the new method mullahs in Malmyzhskii *uezd* were spreading rumors and agitation among Muslims in the region. The Jadids, said Makhlisullin, were telling people, “Muslims need to have their own ruler elected in three years by Muslims.” New method teachers, he charged, “want all Muslims to leave the subjection of the Russian Emperor and unite with Turkey.”⁷⁰ Meanwhile, a licensed mullah in the Orenburg Assembly named Bilal Muzafarov made a similar charge against Nazip Kamaleddinov, a new method teacher and mullah in the village of Musa Kabak. In his deposition to the police, Muzafarov implicated both his local rival, Kamaleddinov, as well as the well-known Jadid Muhammadcan Galiev, who had been active in promoting new method education in Kazan since the 1880s.

Kamaleddinov had become familiar with the new method from a Mullah Galiev in Kazan, I can’t remember his first name. He says Tatars need to separate themselves from Russians. This came from the influence of the Kazan Mullah Galiev, who studied in Turkey, to which Galiev has traveled a number of times over an extended period of time.⁷¹

While these denunciations were often directed against specific individuals (usually new method teachers) residing in or nearby the communities where those making the denunciations themselves lived, many of these denunciations also included the names of several figures from the *İttifak* leadership. In early 1911,

for example, an imam named Samigulla Mukhlisulin reported to the police that Abdullah Apanaev had been telling Muslims at the Muslim congresses that Russian Muslims “should live under the Turkish Sultan, not the Russian Tsar,” and that Abdullah Bubi advocated that Tatars elect a *padişah* of their own and separate from Russia.⁷² In July of that year, İshmöhämmät Dinmöhämmät himself informed the police that “the main spreaders of pan-Islamist propaganda” were Abdürreşid İbrahimov, Sadrettin Maksudov, Galimcan Galiev, Abdullah Apanaev, Yusuf Akçura, Ali Merdan Bey Topçibaşev, the Bubi brothers, and Fatih Kerimi.⁷³ These denunciations resulted in far-reaching police investigations and the arrest of many of the individuals they implicated. In 1911, the Bubi *Medrese* was shut down on suspicions that it had become a “pan-Islamist” breeding ground,⁷⁴ while figures such as Galiev, Akçura, Fatih Kerimi, and many of the village *medrese* teachers named in the denunciations were arrested, or else came under increased surveillance and investigation.⁷⁵

While it may be tempting to dismiss the *İttifak* party due to its general lack of success in passing important legislation in parliament, it is nevertheless important to remember how this movement appeared to Muslims—particularly in the Volga-Ural region, where political engagement among Muslims was strongest—in the early months and years of the revolution. In an era in which many Russian subjects of all faiths were looking to parliament to implement social and legal change in the empire, the *İttifak* movement had originally been viewed by a large cross-section of Muslims—Jadid and otherwise—as constituting the voice of Muslims in parliament. For as long as parliament itself appeared to be a strong (or potentially strong) institution in Russia, there seemed to be a genuine possibility that the Jadids who led *İttifak* would succeed in carrying out their reforms. Efforts by the *İttifak* leadership at the August 1906 Congress to impose new method education upon Muslims—no matter how fruitless these efforts would ultimately prove—thus struck many traditional teachers as a credible threat. While there were several factors contributing to the decline of the *İttifak* party, including the adoption of a more restrictive election law prior to the third Duma elections, *İttifak* members themselves took notice of a rise in Muslim opposition to the party.⁷⁶ In the elections to the third and fourth Dumas, the number of *İttifak* representatives elected from the Volga-Ural region would drop steadily.⁷⁷

Muslim cultural reform in the southern Caucasus

Compared to the Volga-Ural region and the Crimea, circumstances concerning Muslim education in the southern Caucasus were quite different, especially as there was a much smaller number of new method schools in the province of Baku at the turn of the century than in the other two regions.⁷⁸ After 1905, however, new method education in the southern Caucasus increased, though not at the pace seen in the Volga-Ural region or the Crimea. New schools opening in the southern Caucasus tended to be located in big cities like Baku, Tbilisi, and Yerevan, or else in towns like Shushe or Shekke. In this respect, the expansion of new method education in the southern Caucasus likewise differed from that of the Volga-Ural

region and the Crimea, where growth in new method education after 1905 was characterized by rapid expansion not only in big cities, but also in villages.

One of the most important reasons behind the comparatively slow pace of new method expansion in the southern Caucasus stemmed from the relative lack of freedom in the region. Due to the greater powers afforded to the vice-regency of the Caucasus in the aftermath of the labor unrest and armed Armenian-Muslim conflict which occurred during the years 1902–06, far more controls were placed upon organized activity than in the Volga-Ural region or the Crimea. Thus, while in the Volga-Ural region Jadids were able to open hundreds of schools without official permission, supporters of new method education and community reform in the Caucasus were more closely monitored and circumscribed in their actions. New method schools opening in the southern Caucasus after 1905 tended to be opened by officially sanctioned organizations which described the schools as “Russian-Tatar” educational facilities which taught literacy in both Russian and “Turkish.”⁷⁹ Because the organizations establishing new method schools usually worked through official channels, fewer schools were opened and it took more time in order to gain official approval for opening them.⁸⁰

Within Muslim communities, new method education was a far less controversial issue in the southern Caucasus than it was in other regions of Russia. Unlike the Volga-Ural region and the Crimea, where even very poor villages often had a teacher of their own, in the Caucasus there were many villages, even in the relatively central province of Baku, with no nearby school or teacher.⁸¹ While Jadids in the Volga-Ural region often upset existing teachers and communities alike by moving into communities where teachers were already working, in the southern Caucasus communities were often grateful to be provided with any teacher at all.⁸² Consequently, in the southern Caucasus new method schools tended to be founded in communities where local inhabitants actually wanted to host them.⁸³

In the southern Caucasus, supporters of new method education made much more of an effort to reach out to traditional teachers working in village *medreses* than was the case in either the Volga-Ural region or the Crimea. According to a report written by an official working in the Baku branch of the Interior Ministry, supporters of new method education in Baku had been in contact with more traditionally-minded teachers in the hinterlands with offers of support. These offers were made in exchange for a promise from traditional teachers to allow new method teachers to work part time at the schools, where they would teach literacy and, if possible, Russian language.

Without doubt there has been enmity between the reformers and the mullahs. However, the reformers are trying to gradually bring the spiritual personnel and *kadis* over to their side and with their financial support reform the religious schools a little bit, disseminate their program, carry out education through the oral method and, in this way, slowly but surely realize their goals.⁸⁴

One of the best-known organizations promoting literacy in Baku was *Neşr-i Maarif*, which was established in 1908 by the Baku millionaire Abdul Zeynal

Tagiev.⁸⁵ The director of *Neşr-i Maarif* was Ahmet Ağaoğlu, who was also active in *İttifak* and was a well-known publicist whose articles appeared in *Kaspîi*, *Hayat*, and *İrşad*. In some ways, the efforts of this organization to promote literacy among Muslims in the southern Caucasus is comparable to the activities of Jadids in the Volga-Ural region, and in the historiography of Azerbaijan *Neşr-i Maarif* is generally celebrated for its reformist activities and as an Azeri variant of “Jadidism.”⁸⁶ Yet there were also many differences between *Neşr-i Maarif*’s activities and those of the Jadids in the Volga-Ural region.

Neşr-i Maarif operated a relatively small number of schools. In 1908 the organization operated a teachers’ school, a temporary literacy course for adults, and three other schools in Baku. In 1911, *Neşr-i Maarif* opened another eleven schools, including three more in Baku and another eight in villages elsewhere in the province.⁸⁷ These schools were all opened officially, and all paperwork regarding the teachers working there and the types of classes taught at the school was passed on to the inspector for Muslim schools in the province.⁸⁸ Whereas teaching applicants contacting cultural power-brokers in the Volga-Ural region like Fatih Kerimi often emphasized their ideological activism and belief in the Jadidist cause more generally, prospective teachers sending in lists of references and teaching experience did not invoke national slogans in appealing for work, but rather emphasized their teaching qualifications and need for employment.⁸⁹ Salaries were good, but not as high as in the Volga-Ural region, with teachers working for *Neşr-i Maarif* earning between 400 and 500 rubles per year.⁹⁰

Economic issues were connected to political ones. While there had already been, for a variety of reasons, opposition to new method education in the years preceding the 1905 revolution, the expansion of Jadid education in the years after 1905 exacerbated these divisions. The Third Muslim Congress of August 1906 signaled the transformation of *İttifak* from a coalition of various Muslim interests into a narrower vehicle for Muslim cultural reform. Although in hindsight it may appear obvious that *İttifak* lacked the political strength and organizational capacity to execute the plans of Akçura and others concerning the expansion of new method education and the reorganization of the Muslim spiritual assemblies, at the time these developments took place such a direction was not necessarily obvious to alarmed, and often hungry, spiritual personnel. That the denunciation of Jadids as “pan-Turkists” by spiritual personnel began in earnest in 1909—the same year in which the famine became more desperate—hardly appears in this light to have been a coincidence.

Conclusions

Differences among Muslims with respect to the movement for Muslim cultural reform were not limited solely to the arguments and ideas of well-known activist-intellectuals, but also were closely bound up with much more tangible matters pertaining to economics and political power within Muslim communities. Traditional teachers resisted the expansion of new method schools in their villages not only to protect their cultural capital, but also in defense of their actual capital – not

to mention their ability to feed themselves and their families. In the Volga-Ural region, resistance among spiritual personnel to the spread of new method education eventually developed into a coordinated denunciation campaign occurring over a span of three years, contributing to the closing of new method schools and the jailing and exile of both famous and obscure Jadids. Traditional teachers working as spiritual personnel in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly were the most galvanized in their opposition to the spread of new method education, but they were not the only ones to oppose the expansion of Jadidist educational facilities or the efforts of the *İttifak* leadership to impose new method education upon Muslim communities.

Nevertheless, conditions and attitudes varied according to region. In the Volga region, Muslims had been protesting frequently since the 1870s. Issues pertaining to the supervision of Muslim schools and the study of Russian were of concern to a much broader segment of the population in the Volga region than elsewhere. This is because most of the new laws against which Volga Muslims had been protesting had not been applied to Muslim communities living outside the jurisdiction of the Orenburg Assembly. In the Crimea, the creation of illegal schools and the popularity of new method education was closely linked to the Ottoman Empire and the presence of a large population of Ottoman-trained semi-transient teachers. In the southern Caucasus, meanwhile, the place of new method education in the minds of both Muslims and government officials likewise reflected local conditions pertaining to both the availability of Muslim schooling and the organizational approaches of local Jadids.

As scholarly discussions pertaining to Muslims in imperial Russia have shifted, in recent years, toward increasingly state-centered narratives focusing upon the administration of Muslim communities by tsarist authorities, it is perhaps understandable that the Jadids would fall, to some degree, out of historiographical fashion. But the Jadids also constituted the most vocal and public Muslim critics of tsarist administration. Ignoring the Jadids, or dismissing them as detached intellectuals, limits one’s ability to measure the attitudes of Muslims towards the tsarist state and its institutions. While the Jadids were often deeply unpopular among many Muslims, their concerns—if not their prescriptions—nevertheless reflected the concerns of a much broader segment of the Muslim population. Far from standing outside of Muslim communities, the Jadids often found themselves in the very thick of a widening web of issues that mattered greatly to Muslim communities and state officials alike.

Notes

- 1 Throughout this chapter I employ the term “activist-intellectuals” to refer to well-known publicists and writers like İsmail Gasprinskii, Yusuf Akçura, and Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and to distinguish such figures from more obscure jadid figures, such as the teachers discussed in this article.
- 2 Particularly in the older literature on Jadidism, the “Qadims” are discussed as if they were an intellectual “camp,” while the Orenburg-based journal *Din ve Mağîset* is presented as the center of “Qadimism” in Russia. İbrahim Maraş notes that “Qadims” did

not use this name among themselves, and that the term was generally used as an epithet by Jadids. İbrahim Maraş, *Türk Dünyasında Dini Yenileşme, 1850–1917* (Istanbul: Ötüken, 2002), 22.

- 3 By far, the most original and important study on the Jadids to have emerged in many years is Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). One of the main benefits of this study lies in nuanced reformulation of a narrative had long been quite hagiographical with respect to Jadids and generally dismissive of the concerns of their opponents.
- 4 Some other well-known studies which discuss Jadidism include Serge Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier-Quellejay, *La presse et les mouvements nationaux chez les musulmans de Russie* (Paris: Mouton, 1964). An early and still valuable source on İsmail Gasprinskii is Edward J. Lazzerini, "İsmail Bey Gasprinskii and Muslim Modernism in Russia, 1878–1914" (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1973). Alan W. Fisher, "A Model Leader for Asia, İsmail Gaspirali," in Edward A. Allworth, ed., *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), 29–47; Alan W. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978); Tadeusz Swietochowski, *Russian Azerbaijan 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Azade-Ayşe Rorlich, *The Volga Tatars: A Profile In National Resilience* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986); Audrey L. Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1992); Hakan Kırımlı, *National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996); Ahmet Kanlıere, *Reform within Islam: The Tajdid and Jadid Movement among the Kazan Tatars (1809–1917): Conciliation or Conflict?* (Istanbul: Eren, 1997); İa. G. Abdullin, *Dzhadidizm sredi tatar: voznikonovienie, razvitie i istoricheskoe mesto* (Kazan: İman, 1998); S. Y. Süleymanova, *Azərbaycanda ictimai-siyasi hərəkət (XIX yüzilliyin sonu–XX yüzilliyin əvvəlləri)* (Baku: Azərbaycan Dövlət Kitab Palatası, 1999); D. İskhakov, "Dzhadidizm," in *İslam i musul'manskaia kul'tura v Srednem Povolzh'e: Istoriia i sovremennost'* (Kazan: Institut istorii Akademii nauk Tatarstana, 2002); Maraş, *Türk Dünyasında Dini Yenileşme*; D. B. Seyidzadə, *Azərbaycan XX əsrin əvvəllərində: müstəqilliyə aparan yollar* (Baku: OKA, 2004).
- 5 Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, 5–7.
- 6 See, for example, Akram Khater's discussion of Christian Lebanese reformist publicists in the United States. Akram Fouad Khater, *Inventing Home: Emigration, Gender, and the Middle Class in Lebanon, 1870–1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), esp. 93–105. Also see, for example, essays written by Muslim modernists in Indonesia, India, and elsewhere in Charles Kurzman, ed., *Modernist Islam, 1840–1940: A Sourcebook* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Akram Fouad Khater, ed., *Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004), esp. 66–111. Also see Lazzerini, "İsmail Bey Gasprinskii," 144–170; Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in The Late Ottoman State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 175, 199–205.
- 7 "Turkic" (*Turki*), was the language in which İsmail Gasprinskii wanted Muslim textbooks to be printed. See later in this chapter.
- 8 Adeeb Khalid perceptively notes the tendency within an earlier generation of scholarly literature to uncritically adopt the Jadids' own rhetoric concerning traditional education. Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, 25.
- 9 Lazzerini, "İsmail Bey Gasprinskii," 188–189.
- 10 Lazzerini, "İsmail Bey Gasprinskii," 24–40.
- 11 See Munir İusupov, *Galimdzhan Barudi* (Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izd-vo, 2002), 60–102. On Barudi, also see Yusuf Akçura, *Damla Galimcan Al-Barudi* (Kazan: Şerif Matbaası, 1907).
- 12 Kırımlı, *National Movements*, 49; "Bahçesaray," *Tercüman*, July 23, 1895; Meyer, "Turkic Worlds: Community Representation and Collective Identity in the Russian and Ottoman Empires" (PhD diss., Brown University, 2007), esp. 97–104. On new method expansion in the 1890s, see Mustafa Özgür Tuna, "Imperial Russia's Muslims: Inroads of Modernity" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2009), esp. 235–236.
- 13 Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA), f. 821, op. 133, d. 472, l. 49.
- 14 A 1912 report published in the Jadid journal *Ang* in 1913 reported that "there are more new method schools in the province of Orenburg than anywhere else." See Borhan Sherif, "Orenburg gubernasında möselmannar," *Ang*, June 2, 1913, pp. 29–31.
- 15 RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 472, l. 49.
- 16 RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, l. 85.
- 17 State Archive of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (GAARK), f. 100, op. 1, d. 2360, ll. 190–192, 230–231. In the Crimea, unlike the territories of the Orenburg Assembly, schools were under the direct supervision of the Muslim spiritual assembly leadership.
- 18 "Turetskie prosvetiteli v Krymu," *Sotrudnik*, 40, August 8, 1910, 631, 630–632.
- 19 National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan (NART), f. 160, op. 1, d. 1576, ll. 203–253.
- 20 NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 8777, ll. 68–71.
- 21 Tuna, "Imperial Russia's Muslims," 237.
- 22 Regarding Ottoman subjects working as teachers in the Crimea, see GAARK, f. 100, op. 1, d. 2360. On public education reforms in the Ottoman Empire, see Benjamin Fortna, *Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Bayram Kodaman, *Abdülhamid Devri Eğitim Sistemi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988); Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839–1908: Islamism, Autocracy, and Discipline* (London: Brill, 2001).
- 23 Meyer, "Turkic Worlds," 245–247. Also see GAARK, f. 26, op. 3, d. 362; f. 100, op. 1, d. 2360, ll. 2–5, 34–42, 164. Some of these teachers were Russian subjects educated in Istanbul, others were Ottoman subjects traveling to Russia to teach. On the former, see the article by "İslamoğlu" discussing the history of Russian Muslims studying in the Ottoman capital. "İstanbul'da Rusyalı İslam Talebeleri," *Taze Hayat* 66, April 3, 1907. For the latter, see RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 463, ll. 8, 23; NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 8777, l. 10. Also see the Ottoman Prime Ministry archive (BOA), HRH 574/26, s. 1–2.
- 24 Meyer, "Turkic Worlds," 247–248. Also see letter from Yusuf Akçura to Fatih Kerimi, 10 March 1909, NART, f. 1370, op. 1, d. 20, l. 24.
- 25 See, for example, the letter written by a Russian Muslim student in Istanbul to Fatih Kerimi on March 8, 1908. NART, f. 1370, op. 2, d. 24, l. 3. Also see NART, f. 1370, op. 2, d. 28, l. 50 and f. 1370, op. 2, d. 28, l. 69. A fund-raising letter written from a Russian Muslim student in Istanbul that was intercepted by tsarist security officials can be found in RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, ll. 67–68.
- 26 Indeed, a common complaint among some Jadid publicists was that many teachers and schools were "new method" in name only, a development that was at least in part a consequence of the fashionableness of new method education during the post-1905 years. Abdürreşid İbrahimov, "Bize ait," *Hayat*, November 11, 1905. Also see Borhan Sherif, *Gani Bey* (Orenburg: Izd-vo "Vakit," 1913), 48.
- 27 A petition circulated by Rızaeddin Fahreddin at the April 10, 1905 Ufa meeting chaired by Müftü Soltanov envisioned pegging the salaries of teachers associated with the Orenburg Assembly at 240 rubles per year, but this proposal did not bear fruit. Bigi, *İslahat Esasları* (Petrograd: Tipografia M. A. Maksutova, 1915), 76.
- 28 In April of 1900, for example, Orenburg authorities in Ufa received a petition from one Abdullah who was working as a licensed *akhund* in the *uezd* of Orenburg. Abdullah wrote that, according to the agreement he had with the inhabitants of his village, he was allowed to grow wheat on one-half *desiatina* of the village's land. In recent months, however, thieves had been sneaking into his fields and stealing his wheat, despite the

- fact that the villagers in question were doing well, harvesting up to 500 *pud* per year from their own fields. Without financial or other forms of material support from the village, Abdullah feared that he would be unable to feed his family. Central State Archive of the Republic of Bashkortostan (TsGIA RB), f. 1-295, op. 10, d. 205, ll. 130–131. A *pud* is equal to 16.38 kilograms.
- 29 For the original document detailing the plans for assistance, see Kazan State University Lobachevsky Library, Department of Rare Books and Manuscripts (KSU), Document T-1235, "Orenburg dukhovnoe sobranieseneng khökümet tarafınan birilmish ssudalamı mokhtadz imamnarga ulashıp biru hakındaki tedbirleri." Ufa, 1909. On the difficult conditions of Muslim spiritual figures in the Volga-Ural region, see "Imamlarin haline bir nazar," *Din ve Mağışet* 16, May 4, 1907, 253–254. Also see Naganawa Norihiro, "Molding the Muslim Community through the Tsarist Administration: *Mahalla* under the Jurisdiction of the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly after 1905," *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 23 (2006), 114.
 - 30 Madina Rakhimkulova, *Medrese "Khusainiia" v Orenburge: 2-e dopolnennoe iubileinoe izdanie, posviashchennoe 160-letiiu Akhmet baia Khusainova* (Orenburg: Yanga Vakıt, 1997), 14.
 - 31 *Mağlumat* 15, August 15, 1908, p. 333.
 - 32 RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 626, l. 12.
 - 33 NART, f. 160, op. 1, d. 1576, l. 3.
 - 34 Rakhimkulova, *Medrese "Khusainiia,"* 9–10.
 - 35 TsGIA RB, f. 1-295, op. 11, d. 205, l. 279.
 - 36 TsGIA RB, f. 1-295, op. 11, d. 523, esp. ll. 152–159.
 - 37 GAARK, f. 100, op. 1, d. 2374, l. 87.
 - 38 GAARK, f. 100, op. 1, d. 2374, ll. 79–81.
 - 39 GAARK, f. 100, op. 1, d. 2374, ll. 83–87.
 - 40 Kerimi was the editor of the Orenburg newspaper *Vakit* and was closely involved in Jadid projects in the region.
 - 41 This is the family of Yusuf Akçurın, later Akçura.
 - 42 NART, f. 1370, op. 1, d. 20, ll. 21–23.
 - 43 Allen Frank makes this argument, but bases his conclusions upon a single manuscript relating to just one district. Allen Frank, *Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia: The Islamic World of Novouzensk District and the Kazakh Inner Horde, 1789–1910* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 315.
 - 44 Non-elite Muslims living in regions where the assemblies had longer institutional roots – the Volga-Ural region and the Crimea in particular – were far more involved in discussions and political maneuvering relating to the future of the assemblies than was the case in the southern Caucasus. In the northern Caucasus and Central Asia, such institutions did not exist at all.
 - 45 Hayrullah Usmanov, an *akhund* from Orenburg who was appointed to the position of kadi in 1906, sat in parliament as an *İttifak* member and became the fraction's parliamentary secretary. While contributing articles to the Jadidist press (such as Fatih Kerimi's *Vakit* newspaper), he was also a regular contributor to the anti-Jadid *Din ve Mağışet*, where he addressed petitions he received from Muslim spiritual personnel who were angry about *İttifak*'s education policies. Usmanov was hardly the person from the non-Jadid ulama to sit in parliament as an *İttifak* representative. See Meyer, "Turkic Worlds," 164–165.
 - 46 On relations between the *İttifak* leadership and Müfti Soltanov of the Orenburg Assembly, see Meyer, "Turkic Worlds," 151–156. On tensions between Gasprinskii and Müfti Karashaiskii of the Tavridian Assembly, see 156–159. On tensions in the southern Caucasus between community activists and spiritual assembly leaders, see 160–162.
 - 47 The list of articles that were changed as a result of these negotiations is published in "31 mart pravilası," *Ural* 5, January 21, 1907. On the March 31 Regulations, also see Bigi, *Islahat Esaslari*, 236–238.

- 48 Yusuf Akçura, "Rusya musulmanları ittifağı, programma lahasının tedkiki IV," *Kazan Mukhbiri* 131, August 9, 1906. Also see Meyer, "Turkic Worlds," 167–168.
- 49 This was particularly the case in the Caucasus. "Üçüncü umum Rusya müsülman içtimaina dair," *İrşad* 197, August 21, 1906. Ali Merdan Bey Topçibaşev was one of the chairmen with this congress, but Topçibaşev had spent most of his time since 1905 in St. Petersburg. Muslims who had stayed in Baku throughout the Armenian–Muslim fighting and its aftermath included Ahmet Bey Ağaoğlu and Ali Bey Hüseyinzade. Ağaoğlu, in particular, was involved in a number of activities devoted to community welfare, and was appointed to the Muslim side of the peace talks sponsored by the regional vice-regency.
- 50 *1906 sene 16–21 Avgust'ta ictima etmiş Rusya Müslümanlarının nedvesi* (Kazan: Brat'ia Karimovy, 1906), 60–61.
- 51 *Ibid.*, 60–61.
- 52 *Ibid.*, 76–77.
- 53 See, for example, Lazzerini, "İsmail Bey Gasprinskii," 211–213. Gasprinskii had been the most prominent Muslim reformer calling for the establishment of a "common literary language" (known as *Türki*) since early 1906. For more on the so-called "language issue," see Meyer, "Turkic Worlds," 203–206.
- 54 Indeed, İsmail Gasprinskii and Abdürreşid İbrahimov had advocated the study of Russian among Muslims for decades.
- 55 Muslim protests against mandatory Muslim education constituted just one of a series of issues which generated petition campaigns and protests among Volga Muslims from 1878 onwards. Meyer, "Turkic Worlds," 74–91.
- 56 *1906 sene 16–21 Avgust'ta*, 84–85.
- 57 *Ibid.*, 70.
- 58 *Ibid.*, 108–109.
- 59 *Ibid.*, 124–125.
- 60 *Din ve Mağışet* 19, May 25, 1907, 297–299.
- 61 "Zamanlar üzgäre bit efendilär!" *Din ve Mağışet* 19, 299–300.
- 62 "Asıl Ruslar ve İslam," *İrşad* 95, May 23, 1907; "Acip tedbirlerdir!!" *İrşad* 25, February 28, 1908.
- 63 RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, ll. 55–56.
- 64 RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, ll. 45–56.
- 65 RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, ll. 55–56.
- 66 İshmöhämmät Dinmöhämmät (1849–1919) was a mullah who ran a school in the village of Tiunter. See "İshmöhämmät Dinmöhämmätev," *Tatarstan Entsiklopediia Süzlege*, 202.
- 67 See, for example, NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, esp. ll. 6, 71. On complaints regarding the denunciations, see "Ulemaga gariza," *Beyan ul-hak* 25 and "Mühim bir mesele," *Beyan ul-hak* 32.
- 68 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 52; f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 246; f. 199, op. 1, d. 795, l. 92; f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 67.
- 69 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 675, ll. 17–18.
- 70 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, ll. 33–34.
- 71 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 67. Other denunciations can be found in NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 675, l. 66; f. 199, op. 1, d. 785, ll. 98, 151, 153; f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, ll. 58, 67, 69, 88, 99–101, 103, 114–115, 116–118, 251–261, 288–89, 323–324, 331–334, 336–346; f. 199, op. 1, d. 795, ll. 30, 83, 92.
- 72 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, ll. 33–34.
- 73 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 795, l. 92.
- 74 For investigations into Bubi, see NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 675, ll. 26–33; RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, ll. 84–94.
- 75 See, especially, NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 675, ll. 34, 37, 43, 55, 69, 76, 83, 175; f. 199,

- op. 1, d. 785, l. 109; f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 44; f. 199, op. 1, d. 857, ll. 19, 39; f. 92, op. 2, d. 8777, l. 67; f. 199, op. 1, d. 948, ll. 103, 263.
- 76 Letter from Kazan Gabishev to Fatih Kerimi, June 3 1912. NART, f. 1370, op. 1, d. 23, ll. 6–7. On contemporary newspaper articles in both the Jadid and non-Jadid press relating to mounting Muslim opposition to *Ittifaq* see “Möselmannarga,” *Vakit* 156, June 7, 1907; *Din ve Mağışet* 19, 297–299; “Zamanlar üzgäre bit efendilär!” *Din ve Mağışet* 19, May 25, 1907, 299–300; “Protest,” *Beyan al-Hak* 66, September 12, 1906; “Piterburg’da Müslüman fraksiyasının ihtilafi,” *İrşad* 52, March 25, 1907.
- 77 Tables showing the total number of *Ittifaq* deputies sitting in the four Dumas can be found in *Musulmanskaia fraksiia i problemy “svobody sovesti” v Gosudarstvennoi Dume Rossii (1906–1917)* (Kazan: Master Lain, 1999), 128–146. Also see M. F. Usal, *Birinci, ikinci, ve üçüncü Dumada müslüman deputatlar [häm alarning kılğan eshlere]* (Kazan: Tipografiia I. N. Kharitonova, 1909).
- 78 In 1905, for example, the governor of the province of Baku had been able to report that the entire reform movement in the province consisted of just “a number of Muslims living in the city of Baku,” including Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Ali Merdan Bey Topçibaşev, and a handful of others. Azerbaijan State History Archive (ADTA), f. 45, op. 1, d. 35, ll. 34–36.
- 79 ADTA, f. 312, op. 1, d. 39, l. 1.
- 80 ADTA, f. 312, op. 2, d. 9, l. 3; f. 312, op. 8, d. 2; f. 312, op. 1, d. 30, l. 1.
- 81 See, for example, Ahmet Ağaoğlu’s travelogue “Menim Seyahatım,” published in the newspaper *İrşad* from mid-December 1906 until mid-January 1907, especially “Menim Seyahatım,” *İrşad* 7, Jan 10, 1907. Also see *İrşad* 3, January 4, 1907.
- 82 ADTA, f. 312, op. 2, d. 2, ll. 1–7; f. 312, op. 1, d. 63, l. 6a; f. 312, op. 2, d. 10, ll. 1, 3; f. 312, op. 2, d. 9, l. 1.
- 83 See, for example, ADTA, f. 312, op. 1, d. 39, l. 2 for a copy of a petition sent by a village to the organization *Neşri Maarif* asking that they construct a school in their locale.
- 84 ADTA, f. 524, op. 1, d. 11, 22.
- 85 For a report on Neşri Maarif’s activities, also see *Baku Müslüman “Neşri Maarif” cemiyetinin 1907–1911 yıllara mahsus dahil-hariçnin hesabnamesi* (Baku: Kaspîi Matbaası, 1912).
- 86 Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks*, 33, 56–57.
- 87 ADTA, f. 312, op. 1, d. 6, ll. 1–5; f. 312, op. 1, d. 39, l. 1.
- 88 ADTA, f. 312, op. 1, d. 6, ll. 1–5.
- 89 ADTA, f. 312, op. 2, d. 5, l. 3; f. 312, op. 2, d. 8, ll. 10, 12; f. 312, op. 2, d. 9, l. 1; f. 312, op. 2, d. 10, ll. 1, 3.
- 90 ADTA, f. 312, op. 2, d. 5, ll. 2, 4, 6; f. 312, op. 2, d. 1, l. 2; f. 312, op. 2, d. 12, l. 3; f. 312, op. 2, d. 16, l. 9.